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Abstract
In this paper, we study the problem of inventory management for a buyer whose or-
dering is governed by a multi-period adjustment contract that allows the buyer to adjust
his inventory level upwards or downwards during an ordering period. Under this type
of arrangement, the buyer has added flexibility in inventory control so as to reduce his
inventory risk. The flexibility, however, likely comes at a cost, i.e., at a higher price per
unit of inventory bought and a lower price per unit of inventory sold during an ordering
period. This type of supply contract mimics the flexibility obtained from purchasing on
a spot market by offering the buyer multiple adjustment opportunities in each ordering
period, but with fixed prices. We prove the structure of the optimal inventory policy
for a buyer who procures inventory under a portfolio of supply contracts consisting of a
wholesale price contract and an adjustment contract. We also quantify the benefits of
using the adjustment contract for the buyer.
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11 Introduction
Given the complexity and increasing globalization of modern supply chains, and despite the
trend toward long-term supplier partnerships, it is not uncommon for buyers (including retailers
and manufacturers) to acquire identical goods from multiple sources; see, e.g., McMillan (1990),
Richardson (1993) and Latour (2001). The use of multiple sources is particularly important in
industries for which supply chain reliability and resiliency are critical (Sheffi et al. 2003). In
addition, multiple supply sources can be used to balance the various risks in a supply chain,
e.g., demand and price uncertainty (Martinez-de-Albeniz and Simchi-Levi, 2005).
When using multi-sourcing, buyers must balance competing priorities, such as cost, lead
time, reliability and flexibility. For example, Hewlett Packard (HP) uses a multi-sourcing
strategy that allows them to spread inventory risk over a number of suppliers. Some suppliers
operate under long-term contracts, which are used to meet about 90% of expected demand.
These contracts are supplemented with suppliers who operate under short-term contracts with
slightly higher unit prices but guaranteed availability to cover uncertainties in demand. In 2001,
of HP’s commodity purchasing expense, 50% was through long-term contracts negotiated with
suppliers, 35% was through nonbinding agreements which provided high flexibility, and 15%
was used for purchases on spot markets. For details, see Billington (2002) and Carbone (2001).
As the above example demonstrates, the use of multi-sourcing generally involves the man-
agement of different types of supply contracts for different suppliers. In the existing literature,
many types of supply contracts have been considered, some of which are also commonly used
in practice, including buyback, quantity flexibility, revenue sharing and option contracts. More
recently, researchers have studied portfolios of contracts, i.e., a buyer who makes procurement
decisions under a set of supply contracts or a combination of supply contracts and spot market
procurement (see, e.g., Mart´ınez-de-Albe´niz and Simchi-Levi (2002), Wu et al. (2002)).
Spot market participation theoretically provides the buyer the most flexibility in inventory
control but has high price uncertainty due to fluctuations in supply and demand (see Kleindorfer
and Wu (2003) for a review of the literature on combining supply contracting and spot markets).
To mimic the flexibility of the spot market, we consider a buyer who procures inventory, in part,
under an adjustment contract. Such a contract allows a buyer to frequently adjust his inventory
level upwards or downwards at a corresponding buying or selling price. The flexibility provided
by the adjustment contract is especially valuable for products with high demand uncertainty
2and large shortage costs, e.g., critical machine parts, high-tech products, fashion items. This
flexibility, however, comes at a cost, i.e., a (relatively) high price per unit of inventory purchased
and a (relatively) low price per unit of inventory returned. We thus consider a buyer who
procures inventory from two sources, one of which operates under a standard wholesale price
contract, while the other operates under the adjustment contract. The buyer can thus take
advantage of the low purchase price of the wholesale price contract and the inventory flexibility
of the adjustment contract. In this paper, our goal is to determine how the buyer should
operate, i.e., manage its ordering and inventory decisions, given this portfolio of contracts.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the related literature.
Section 3 presents the optimal inventory policy for a buyer for multi-period model with multiple
adjustment opportunities. In Section 4 we study the value of the adjustment contract to the
buyer. In Section 5 we consider several extensions, including fixed order costs, order bounds
and positive lead times. In Section 6 we present the results of an extensive computational study.
Section 7 provides a conclusion and a discussion of future research.
2 Literature Review
Since this paper considers the procurement decisions of a buyer who purchases inventory from
multiple sources under a portfolio of multi-period supply contracts, we will focus our literature
review on the previous research considering procurement decisions with multiple supply options.
In addition, since the adjustment contract considered in this paper has some similarities to spot
market procurement, we will briefly review the literature considering the use of spot market
purchases to supplement procurement under more conventional supply contracts.
2.1 Procurement Decisions with Multiple Supply Options
There is an extensive body of research on inventory management for a buyer who procures
inventory from multiple sources. See Minner (2003) for a review. The papers in this area make
varying assumptions regarding the differences between the supply sources in terms of costs, lead
times, prices, etc. For example, numerous authors have considered the problem of inventory
management for a buyer who procures inventory from multiple sources with differing price and
lead time combinations, e.g., Whittmore and Saunders (1977), Moinzadeh and Nahmias (1988),
Mart´ınez-de-Albe´niz (2006), Veeraraghavan and Sheller-Wolf (2006), Yazlali and Erhun (2007),
3etc. Several other authors have considered the problem of a buyer who can place emergency or
expedited orders, e.g., Chiang and Gutierrez (1998), Lawson and Porteus (2000) and Tagaras
and Vlachos (2001). Other authors have considered the value of multi-sourcing for coping with
the risk of a supply disruption, e.g., Parlar and Perry (1996) and Tomlin (2006), or for coping
with yield uncertainty, e.g., Gerchak and Parlar (1990) and Anupindi and Akella (1993), etc.
The current paper differs from this literature in that we consider suppliers who differ in the
degree of procurement flexibility they provide to the buyer. In addition to purchasing under
a standard wholesale price contract, which allows inventory to be ordered at fixed intervals
at a given price, the buyer also has the option of procuring inventory under an adjustment
contract that allows more frequent replenishments and lets the buyer return inventory to the
supplier. This additional flexibility comes at a higher procurement cost. While there has been
some literature considering suppliers with differing flexibility, the specific models differ from
that considered in this paper. Janssen and Kok (1999) consider a buyer who procures inventory
from two suppliers under two different types of contracts. The main supplier provides a fixed
quantity, Q, each period. The buyer orders inventory from a second supplier using a periodic
review base-stock policy with base-stock level S. Moinzadeh and Nahmias (2000) study a fixed
delivery contract with adjustments. Under such a contract, a buyer orders a fixed quantity, Q,
each period. Before delivery, the buyer has an opportunity to adjust Q upwards by paying a
fixed cost and an additional cost per unit. The authors assume an (s, S) policy is used for the
adjustments. Our model is similar, but we do not assume a fixed order quantity and we allow
for the return of inventory, rather than the adjustment of the order quantity prior to delivery.
Another stream of literature considers competition between suppliers when the buyer chooses
among them based on a number of criteria, e.g., price and service level. See, for example, Ha
et al. (2003), Cachon and Zhang (2007) and Benjaafar et al. (2007).
2.2 Procurement Decisions with a Spot Market Option
Several authors have considered a buyer who procures inventory using a combination of supply
contracts and spot market procurement. Bonser and Wu (2001) study a procurement problem
in which the buyer may purchase under several supply contracts, each of which specifies a
price and minimum and maximum annual quantities, as well as from a spot market. Mart´ınez-
de-Albe´niz and Simchi-Levi (2002) consider a buyer who purchases goods using a portfolio of
options and flexibility contracts, as well as spot market procurement. Kleinknecht et al. (2002)
4determine the optimal policy for a buyer who procures inventory using both option contracts
and spot market procurement. Lee and Whang (2002) consider a set of buyers who each have
two purchase opportunities. In the first, each buyer can purchase at a fixed price set by the
manufacturer. In the second, the buyers may buy or sell on the spot market given a price
determined endogenously to equate supply and demand. Goel and Gutierrez (2006) consider
incorporating spot market and futures price information into procurement decisions. Two
options are considered: spot market and forward contract procurement. Both allow the buyer
to buy or sell inventory in each period and include transaction costs, so that the buying and
selling prices may differ. Cohen and Agrawal (1999) consider a buyer who can choose between
short and long term contracts with its supplier. A long term contract reduces delivery lead
time and sets a fixed price, but includes a fixed cost at the start of the relationship. The short
term contract includes no fixed cost, but requires the buyer to pay the random market price.
Peleg et al. (2002) consider a buyer who can choose between three procurement strategies: (1)
a long term contract with a single supplier; (2) an on-line search; and (3) a combined strategy.
The authors develop conditions under which each alternative is preferred.
3 Multi-Period Model with Multiple Adjustment Opportunities
In this section, we consider a general multi-period inventory problem for a buyer who procures
inventory using a portfolio of supply contracts consisting of a wholesale price contract and an
adjustment contract. Under the wholesale price contract, the buyer can order inventory at the
start of each review period. Under the adjustment contract, the buyer has several opportunities
to adjust his inventory level, i.e., to purchase or sell inventory, during each ordering period.
3.1 Problem Description
We consider an inventory planning horizon of length T , say [0, T ]. Letm ∈ lN denote the number
of periods and n ∈ lN the number of adjustment opportunities per period. Thus, we consider
a model with n + 1 subperiods in each of the m periods. Let [0, T1), [T1, T2), . . . , [Tm−1, T ]
denote the m periods. We call 0, T1, . . . , Tm−1 the regular order opportunities, when the buyer
may purchase under the wholesale price contract. For period j, i.e., [Tj−1, Tj), j = 1, . . . ,m,
let tj1, . . . , t
j
n denote the adjustment opportunities, when the buyer may buy or sell under the
adjustment contract, where Tj−1
4
= tj0 < t
j
1 < · · · < tjn < tjn+1 4= Tj. We call time interval
5[tji−1, t
j
i ) subperiod i (or the ith subperiod) of period j. The length of the subperiods within a
period and the length of the same subperiod within different periods can differ. For all orders,
we assume instantaneous delivery, i.e., zero lead time. Unsatisfied demand is backlogged. Fixed
order costs are negligible. Below, we list additional assumptions and notation for this model:
1. Let αi(j) ∈ (0, 1) denote the discount factor for the ith subperiod of period j.
2. Let Di(j) ≥ 0 denote the demand during subperiod i in period j with probability density
function (pdf) fi(j)(s) and cumulative distribution function (cdf) Fi(j)(s), s ∈ lR, where
fi(j)(s) = 0, if s < 0, for any i, j. We assume that all the subperiod demands are mutually
independent. However, the discussion can be applied to correlated demands as well.
3. Let wj > 0, j = 1, . . . ,m, denote the wholesale price charged at the start of period j.
4. At the ith adjustment opportunity in period j, the buyer may procure inventory at the
unit cost PBi(j) or may return inventory to the supplier at the price PSi(j) per unit. We
assume PBi(j) ≥ PSi(j), for all i, j.
5. The unit penalty cost is p > 0 and hi(j) > 0 is the unit holding cost for the ith subperiod
of period j. We assume that p > hi(j), p > PBi(j) and p > wj for all i, j.
3.2 Model Formulation and Results
Let C(x) denote the minimum expected cost for the entire planning horizon, given on-hand
inventory level x ∈ lR at time 0. To formulate C(x), we treat each regular order opportunity as
a special adjustment opportunity, referred to as the 0th adjustment opportunity in the period,
with PB0(j) = wj and PS0(j) = −∞, so that the selling opportunity will never be used.
Utilizing this idea, we have the following dynamic programming (DP) formulation for C(x):
C(x)
4
= C0(1)(x) = min
y≥x
{
w1(y − x) + L1(1)(y) + α1(1)
∫ ∞
−∞
C1(1)(y − s)f1(1)(s)ds
}
, (1)
where Li(j)(y) is the usual expected holding and penalty cost for the ith subperiod of period j
with starting inventory level y, for i = 1, . . . , n + 1, j = 1, . . . ,m and Ci(j)(z) is the minimum
expected cost for the remainder of the horizon after the ith adjustment in period j, given the
6on-hand inventory level z, z ∈ lR. Thus, Ci(j)(z), i = 0, 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . ,m, satisfies:
Ci(j)(z) =
{
min
ZB≥z
PBi(j)(ZB − z) + Li+1(j)(ZB) + αi+1(j)
∫ ∞
−∞
Ci+1(j)(ZB − s)fi+1(j)(s)ds
}
∧{
min
ZS≤z
−PSi(j)(z − ZS) + Li+1(j)(ZS) + αi+1(j)
∫ ∞
−∞
Ci+1(j)(ZS − s)fi+1(j)(s)ds
}
4
=
{
min
ZB≥z
GBi(j)(z, ZB)
}
∧
{
min
ZS≤z
GSi(j)(z, ZS)
}
, (2)
where Cn+1(j)(z) = C0(j+1)(z), Cn+1(m)(z) = 0, for all z ∈ lR and x ∧ y = min{x, y} and
x ∨ y = max{x, y}.
We can prove that the optimal policy is a buy-up-to or sell-down-to policy at the adjust-
ment opportunities, along with a standard order-up-to-policy at the regular order opportunities.
The buy-up-to or sell-down-to policy is similar to the critical interval policy studied by Goel
and Gutierrez (2006). Define Z∗Bi(j) and Z
∗
Si(j) to be the values of ZB and ZS that minimize
GBi(j)(z, ZB) and GSi(j)(z, ZS), respectively. Then (all the proofs are found in Appendix I):
Proposition 3.1 The optimal ith adjustment policy for period j is:

Buy − up− to Z∗Bi(j) if the on-hand inventory level is below Z∗Bi(j),
Neither buy nor sell if the on-hand inventory level is between Z∗Bi(j) and Z
∗
Si(j),
Sell − down− to Z∗Si(j) if the on-hand inventory level is above Z∗Si(j),
and the optimal regular order policy for period j is the order-up-to Z∗B0(j) policy, where Z
∗
Si(j) ≥
Z∗Bi(j) > 0, Z
∗
Bn+1(m) = F
−1
n+1(m)
(
p−PBn+1(m)
hn+1(m)+p
)
and Z∗Sn+1(m) = F
−1
n+1(m)
(
p−PSn+1(m)
hn+1(m)+p
)
.
3.3 Sensitivity Analysis on the Cost Parameters
Next, we study the behavior of the optimal inventory control parameters. We focus on the
single period, single adjustment case, i.e., m = n = 1. For notational convenience, we remove
all the subscripts for periods and subperiods in this section. Specifically, we study the sensitivity
of Y ∗, Z∗B and Z
∗
S, where Y
∗ = Z∗B0 is the optimal order-up-to level, with respect to the cost
parameters, w,PB and PS. Our main results are as follows:
Proposition 3.2
(i) Y ∗ is a nonincreasing function of w, while Z∗B and Z
∗
S do not change as w changes.
(ii) Y ∗ is a nondecreasing function of PB, Z∗B is a nonincreasing function of PB, while Z
∗
S does
not change as PB changes.
7(iii) Y ∗ is a nondecreasing function of PS, Z∗S is a nonincreasing function of PS, while Z
∗
B does
not change as PS changes.
Intuitively, if the wholesale price, w, increases, the buyer should not order more inventory
at the start of the period. However, w will not affect the optimal parameters at the adjustment
time, i.e., Z∗B and Z
∗
S. If the buying price, PB, increases, the buyer should not buy more at the
adjustment time. However, in order to take advantage of the smaller relative value of w, the
buyer may increase his inventory level at the start of the period. This additional inventory can
be used to fill demand in the second subperiod. If the selling price, PS, increases, the buyer
should not sell less at the adjustment time. However, in order to take advantage of the smaller
relative value of w, the buyer may increase his inventory level at the start of the period. Any
excess can be sold at the adjustment time at the higher selling price, PS.
The optimal buy-up-to level, Z∗B, does not depend on the selling price, PS. Similarly, the
optimal sell-down-to level, Z∗S, does not depend on the buying price, PB. Intuitively, the buyer
decides whether to buy or sell at the adjustment opportunity given his on-hand inventory level,
the buying price and the selling price. If the buyer decides to buy, he determines the optimal
buy-up-to level, Z∗B, by minimizing the corresponding inventory cost for the second subperiod,
which does not depend on the selling price, PS. Similarly, if the buyer decides to sell, he
determines the optimal sell-down-to level, Z∗S, without considering the buying price PB.
3.4 Infinite Horizon Model
We next study an infinite horizon version of the model. To simplify the analysis, we consider
homogenous periods and subperiods. Thus, subscripts for periods and subperiods are removed.
Let Ci(z), for all z ∈ lR, denote the minimum expected cost for the remainder of the horizon
after the ith adjustment in any period with initial on-hand inventory level z, i = 0, . . . , n. For
this homogenous infinite horizon model, the rest of the planning horizon after any ith subperiod
looks the same, i.e., Ci(·) does not depend on which period we are in. Thus, we have the
following DP formulation for Ci(z):
C0(z) = min
ZB≥z
{
w(ZB − z) + L(ZB) + α
∫ ∞
−∞
C1(ZB − s)f(s)ds
}
= min
ZB≥z
G0(z, ZB), (3)
8and for i = 1, . . . , n
Ci(z) =
{
min
ZB≥z
PB(ZB − z) + L(ZB) + α
∫ ∞
−∞
Ci+1(ZB − s)f(s)ds
}
∧{
min
ZS≤z
−PS(z − ZS) + L(ZS) + α
∫ ∞
−∞
Ci+1(ZS − s)f(s)ds
}
4
=
{
min
ZB≥z
GBi(z, ZB)
}
∧
{
min
ZS≤z
GSi(z, ZS)
}
, (4)
where Cn+1(x) = C0(x), for all x ∈ lR.
This formulation differs from the usual formulation for an infinite horizon inventory control
problem. Although the remainder of the planning horizon after any ith adjustment opportunity
looks the same, the remainder of the planning horizon after any two different adjustment
opportunities, say the i1th and i2th adjustment opportunities, i1 6= i2, looks different. However,
the cycle from any ith adjustment opportunity to the next ith adjustment opportunity repeats
again and again towards the end of the planning horizon. Therefore, (3)-(4) describe the
iterative relationship among the Ci(·)’s, i = 0, 1, . . . , n.
Given this formulation, we can show that the buy-up-to or sell-down-to policy is still optimal
for the infinite horizon case. Let Z∗Bi and Z
∗
Si be the optimal buy-up-to and sell-down-to inven-
tory levels at the start of any subperiod i. In general, little can be said about the relationship
between Z∗Bi and Z
∗
Si, i = 0, 1, . . . , n. However, if PB = w, we have the following result:
Proposition 3.3 If PB = w, then Z
∗
B0 = Z
∗
B1 = · · · = Z∗Bn = F−1
(
p−(1−α)w
h+p
)
.
This result is somewhat counter intuitive. In our model, even when PB = w, the regular
order opportunities are one-way adjustments, while the adjustment opportunities allow for two-
way adjustments. Therefore, the optimal buy-up-to levels are not necessarily equal, as would be
the case in a traditional infinite horizon model. However, the fact that Z∗Si ≥ Z∗Bi eliminates the
impact of the downward adjustment opportunities on the optimal buy-up-to levels. Therefore,
if the buyer starts the planning horizon with inventory less than or equal to Z∗B0, the buyer
will never sell at an adjustment opportunity. Thus, the order-up-to, buy-up-to or sell-down-to
inventory policy will reduce to an order-up-to policy with a constant order-up-to level.
4 Value of the Adjustment Contract to the Buyer
Clearly, the additional flexibility provided by the adjustment contract should not increase the
expected costs at the buyer. In this section, we demonstrate that, under certain conditions,
9the expected cost for the model with the adjustment contract will be strictly less than for the
model with no adjustment contract. In addition, we show that the expected cost will be strictly
decreasing in the number adjustment opportunities.
4.1 Model with Adjustment vs Model without Adjustment
We consider a single period model and compare the total expected cost with adjustments, C(x),
to the total expected cost for a similar single period model without adjustments, CNA(x). Note
that for this single period model, the subscripts for periods can be removed. The analysis below
can easily be extended to study the multi-period model.
In order to compare the costs for these two models, we need to ensure that the methods used
to assess costs are the same. Note that the holding and shortage penalty costs for the model
with adjustments are assessed at the end of each subperiod, while the holding and penalty costs
for a model without adjustments (i.e., a standard single period inventory model) are usually
assessed at the end of the period. In order to ensure a fair comparison, we will modify the
standard single period (no adjustment) model to charge holding and shortage penalty costs
at the end of each subperiod. Therefore, the no adjustment model is a special case of the
adjustment model with PBi = ∞ and PSi = −∞. Let Y ∗NA and Y ∗ denote the optimal order-
up-to levels for the no adjustment and adjustment models, respectively. Comparing CNA(x) to
C(x), assuming the optimal adjustment policy is used, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 4.1
C(x) < CNA(x) if and only if P
{
x ∨ Y ∗NA −
i∑
k=1
Dk ∈ (∞, Z∗Bi)
⋃
(Z∗Si,∞), for some i
}
> 0.
Note that the above probability condition implies that, with positive probability, some
adjustment opportunity(s) will be utilized. This proposition says that the adjustment contract
always brings positive expected savings to the buyer when compared to a contract with no
adjustment opportunities, as long as with a positive probability the subperiod demands will be
high enough or low enough such that an upward or downward adjustment would be used at
least for once. For example, if the support of the subperiod demands is [0,∞), each upward
adjustment opportunity will be used with a positive probability. Furthermore, if the buying
prices are higher or the selling prices are lower, the buyer is less likely to make use of the
adjustment opportunities (i.e., the probability condition above is less likely to hold).
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4.2 Impact of the Number of Adjustment Opportunities
We next study the impact of the number of adjustment opportunities in a single period. Recall
that n is the number of the adjustment opportunities per period. We study the impact on
the expected cost of having one more adjustment opportunity, which we refer to as an “ex-
tra adjustment”. With this extra adjustment, there are n + 1 adjustment opportunities. Let
Cextra(x) denote the minimum expected cost for the model with an extra adjustment oppor-
tunity. Suppose the extra adjustment occurs in subperiod i. Let Di1 denote the demand in
subperiod i before the extra adjustment and Z∗li1, l = B, S, the optimal adjustment level for the
extra adjustment opportunity. The comparison between Cextra(x) and C(x) can be analyzed
similarly as the comparison between CNA(x) and C(x) in the previous section.
Proposition 4.2
Cextra(x) < C(x) if and only if P
{
x ∨ Y ∗ −
i−1∑
k=1
Dk −Di1 ∈ (−∞, Z∗Bi1)
⋃
(Z∗Si1,∞)
}
> 0.
The proposition implies that the more adjustment opportunities the supplier provides, the
greater the expected savings at the buyer if, with positive probability, that the extra adjustment
will be utilized. In practice, more adjustment opportunities would likely be associated with less
favorable adjustment prices. Therefore, the buyer would need to trade-off this additional cost
with the benefits of having more adjustment opportunities.
Finally, the computational study presented in Section 6 considers the marginal benefit to
the buyer of having more adjustment opportunities. The study indicates that the marginal
benefit decreases in the number of opportunities. Thus, having a small number of adjustment
opportunities may be sufficient for the buyer to achieve a large percentage of the maximum
benefit, i.e., the benefit achieved when the buyer has infinitely many adjustment opportunities.
5 Model Extensions
In this section, we consider three extensions to the basic problem studied in this paper: (i)
fixed costs for regular orders and/or adjustments; (ii) upper bounds on the quantity that can be
ordered at any regular order opportunity and the amount of upward or downward adjustment;
and (iii) a positive constant lead time for each regular order. Here we provide just a brief
overview of the main results. For a more detailed analysis, see Li (2004).
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5.1 Fixed Costs
In this section, we consider fixed costs for each regular order and each adjustment, including
any costs associated with ordering or returning inventory, e.g., the transportation cost.
For an inventory model with a wholesale price contract only, an (s, S) policy is optimal
if there is a fixed order cost. For our single period model with one adjustment opportunity,
we will show that an (z∗B, Z
∗
B), (z
∗
S, Z
∗
S) inventory control policy, similar to an (s, S) policy, is
optimal for the adjustment opportunity, where z∗B < Z
∗
B, z
∗
S > Z
∗
S. Under this policy, at the
adjustment opportunity, the buyer will buy only if his on-hand inventory level is less than z∗B,
and then will order to raise his inventory level up to Z∗B; the buyer will sell only if his on-hand
inventory level is higher than z∗S, and then will sell to decrease his inventory level to Z
∗
S. For
the regular order opportunity, we will demonstrate that an (s, S) type of policy is not optimal.
For the single period model with a single adjustment opportunity, we can write the DP
formulation, including the fixed costs for the regular order and the upward and downward
adjustments, denoted by KO, KB and KS, respectively. Let 1{·} be an indicator function.
C(x) = min
y≥x
{
KO1{y>x} + w(y − x) + L1(y) +
∫ ∞
−∞
C1(y − s)f1(s)ds
}
4
= min
y≥x
H(x, y), (5)
where
C1(z) =
{
min
ZB≥z
KB1{ZB>z} + PB(ZB − z) + L2(ZB)
}
∧
{
min
ZS≤z
KS1{ZS<z} − PS(z − ZS) + L2(ZS)
}
4
=
{
min
ZB≥z
HB(z, ZB)
}
∧
{
min
ZS≥z
HS(z, ZS)
}
. (6)
To determine the optimal policy, we need the following definitions:
Definition 5.1 Let K ≥ 0 and let g(x) be a differentiable function. We say that g(x) is “left”
K-convex if K + g(x+ a)− g(x)− ag′(x) ≥ 0, for all a > 0 and all x ∈ lR.
Definition 5.2 Let K ≥ 0 and let g(x) be a differentiable function. We say that g(x) is “right”
K-convex if K + g(x− b)− g(x) + bg′(x) ≥ 0, for all b > 0 and all x ∈ lR.
The definition of “left” K-convexity is the same as the definition of K-convexity used in
Scarf (1959). This “left” K-convexity is used to guarantee that the change in g(·) from any
local maximum to the global minimum is less than K, where the local maximum is to the left
of the global minimum. This condition is sufficient to prove the optimality of an (s, S) type of
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inventory policy. In contrast, the “right” K-convexity is used to guarantee that the change in
g(·) from any local maximum to the global minimum is less than K, where the local maximum
is to the right of the global minimum. This condition is sufficient to prove the optimality of a
(z∗S, Z
∗
S) type of inventory (return) policy, where z
∗
S > Z
∗
S. This policy says that the inventory
level will be reduced to Z∗S via returns if and only if the inventory level is larger than z
∗
S. We
can now present the following results:
Proposition 5.3 For the single period, single adjustment model with fixed costs for adjust-
ments, a (z∗B, Z
∗
B), (z
∗
S, Z
∗
S) policy is optimal, where z
∗
B and z
∗
S satisfy:
KB + PB(Z
∗
B) + L2(Z
∗
B) = PB(z
∗
B) + L2(z
∗
B), i.e., GB(z
∗
B, Z
∗
B) = GB(z
∗
B, z
∗
B),
KS + PS(Z
∗
S) + L2(Z
∗
S) = PS(z
∗
S) + L2(z
∗
S), i.e., GS(z
∗
S, Z
∗
S) = GS(z
∗
S, z
∗
S), (7)
and Z∗B = F
−1
2
(
p−PB
h2+p
)
and Z∗S = F
−1
2
(
p−PS
h2+p
)
.
Next, we determine whether an (s, S)-type policy is optimal at the regular order opportunity:
Proposition 5.4 Under the (z∗B, Z
∗
B), (z
∗
S, Z
∗
S) policy, w(y−x)+L1(y)+
∫ ∞
−∞
C1(y− s)f1(s)ds
is not “left” KO-convex.
Thus, an (s, S)-type order policy is not generally optimal for the regular order opportunity.
By induction, it is also easy to see that an (s, S)-type order policy is not optimal for any regular
order opportunity in a multi-period model. In addition, for a multi-period, multi-adjustment
model, except at the very last adjustment opportunity, a (z∗B, Z
∗
B), (z
∗
S, Z
∗
S) policy is not optimal.
5.2 Upper Bounds on the Order and Adjustment Quantities
We next consider upper bounds on the quantity that can be ordered and/or the size of the
upward and downward adjustments. Let LO > 0, LB > 0 and LS > 0 denote the upper bounds
on the order quantity, the upward adjustment quantity and the downward adjustment quantity,
respectively. The optimal policy is a modified buy-up-to or sell-down-to policy: If the quantity
needed to raise the inventory level up to Z∗B is greater than the maximum upward adjustment
quantity, i.e., Z∗B − z > LB, then the buyer should buy LB, the maximum amount. Similarly, if
z−Z∗S > LS, it is optimal to sell LS, the maximum amount. For the regular order opportunity,
if the on-hand inventory level is less than Y ∗ − LO, order LO; if the on-hand inventory level is
between Y ∗ − LO and Y ∗, order to raise the inventory level up to Y ∗; otherwise, do not order.
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5.3 Positive Lead Time for Regular Orders
We next consider a positive constant lead time for regular orders. We assume the adjustment
opportunities have zero lead time, part of the flexibility provided by the adjustment contract.
We first discuss the difficulty in analyzing this problem by comparing it to a standard model
with positive order lead times. Karlin and Scarf (1958) proved that an order-up-to inventory
policy is optimal for a buyer facing a wholesale price contract with a constant lead time. They
do so by formulating the problem in terms of the inventory position (on-hand plus on-order
inventory), rather than on-hand inventory. In their case, the order decision at the start of
each period impacts the on-order inventory level, not the on-hand inventory level. However,
in our model we have two contracts: a wholesale price contract and an adjustment contract.
Decisions made at regular order opportunities impact the on-order inventory level, while the
decisions made at the adjustment opportunities impact the on-hand inventory levels. Therefore,
we cannot simply define our system state as either inventory position or on-hand inventory.
The structure of the optimal policy for the positive lead time case is similar to, but more
complicated than, that for the zero lead time case. At each adjustment opportunity, a buy-up-
to and sell-down-to policy is still optimal. However, the optimal buy-up-to and sell-down-to
levels depend on each individual regular order that has been placed, but has not yet arrived, by
the adjustment time. For the regular orders, we can derive an expression for the optimal order
quantity. However, the optimal policy is not an order-up-to policy with fixed order-up-to level.
6 Computational Study
In this section, we present a computational study to supplement the analytical results provided
in this paper. We explore the benefit to the buyer of using the adjustment contract and consider
the sensitivity of the optimal inventory policy parameters. In addition, we consider how the
number of adjustment opportunities and the timing of those opportunities affect the buyer’s
expected cost. All of the figures discussed in this section are contained in Appendix II.
6.1 Experimental Design
We consider both single- and multi-period models (i.e., m = 1 and m > 1) with multiple (n)
adjustment opportunities. We assume equal length subperiods and equal length periods. We
model demand using a homogenous Poisson process with constant arrival rate λ. If the length
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of a subperiod is t > 0, the demand during that subperiod follows Poisson(λt). We assume
that the buyer starts the planning horizon, [0, T ], with zero inventory, there is a constant unit
holding cost, h, and constant buying and selling prices, PB and PS. We set w = 1. We used a
complete factorial design, i.e., we performed experiments for all the combinations of the problem
parameters m,n, PB, PS, h and p. We show only selected, but the most typical, results.
6.2 Value of the Adjustment Contract to the Buyer
We first study how the value of the adjustment contract to the buyer will vary as a function
of the problem parameters, i.e., n, PB, PS, h, p and m. We define the percentage value of the
adjustment contract for the buyer (PV B) to be the percentage difference between the buyer’s
minimum expected cost if he can procure inventory only under the wholesale price contract and
the buyer’s minimum expected cost if he also participates in an adjustment contract. Since we
assume the buyer starts the planning period with zero inventory, we have PV B = CNA(0)−C(0)
CNA(0)
.
Figure 1 shows the typical behavior of PV B as a function of the number of the adjustments,
n, i.e., PV B increases with n for all h and p. The concavity of the PV B curve indicates
that the buyer’s marginal benefit from an additional adjustment opportunity diminishes as
more adjustment opportunities are provided. Thus, having a small number of adjustment
opportunities may be sufficient to capture most of the benefits of the adjustment contract.
Figure 1 shows that when PB is large relative to PS (e.g., PB = 1.9, PS = 0.1), the marginal
benefit diminishes more quickly than when PB is small relative to PS (e.g., PB = 1.1, PS = 0.9).
Note that the buyer will use the adjustment contract less often in the first case than in the second
case. Therefore, in the first case, PV B is relatively small and its marginal value diminishes
more rapidly. Figure 1 also shows the impact of the holding and penalty costs (h and p) on
PV B. The figure indicates that the adjustment contract is more beneficial to the buyer when
his holding cost is large (e.g., expensive items) and his penalty cost is large (e.g., unsatisfied
demands are costly). The flexibility provided by the adjustment contract helps the buyer to
balance his over-stocking and under-stocking costs, thus reducing total inventory cost.
Figure 2 shows the impact of PB and PS on PV B. Generally, for each PS, if PB increases,
PV B decreases and the marginal PV B decreases; for each PB, if PS increases, PV B increases
and the marginal PV B also increases. Thus, as expected, the buyer prefers a lower buying
price and a higher selling price. Figure 2 also shows that, when PB is small, increasing PS does
not have much impact on PV B. However, when PB is large, increasing PS has a significant
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impact on PV B, i.e., an increase in PS is more beneficial to the buyer when PB is large. Note
that when PB is large, the buyer will use the upward adjustment option less often and thus the
regular order quantity will be higher. Since the buyer is more likely to have excess inventory,
the benefit from using the adjustment opportunities is obtained largely from the downward
adjustments. Thus, increasing PS has a greater impact on PV B when PB is large.
Figure 3 shows how the number of periods (m) affects the percentage value of the adjustment
contract for the buyer. As can be seen from the figure, PV B is convex and decreasing in the
number of periods. As the number of the periods increases, the buyer’s benefit from using the
adjustment contract decreases and levels off to a value that is generally significantly greater
than zero. For example, whenm = 7, for all experiments conducted, PV B is still approximately
10%, representing considerable savings over the wholesale price contract.
6.3 Sensitivity Analysis on Optimal Inventory Policy Parameters
We next examine the relationship between the optimal buy-up-to levels, Z∗B1, . . . , Z
∗
Bn, and the
optimal sell-down-to levels, Z∗S1, . . . , Z
∗
Sn, for various PB, PS, h and p. Figure 4 shows the impact
of the buying price on the optimal buy-up-to levels throughout the period, where i represents
the adjustment opportunity, i = 1, . . . , n. For a given PB, Z
∗
Bi decreases as we get later in
the period, i.e., as i increases. Although not shown, our numerical results indicate that Z∗Si
decreases as i increases. Thus, the buyer should store less inventory later in the period.
Figure 4 also indicates that, as PB increases, Z
∗
Bi decreases or stays unchanged, for all i.
Intuitively, as PB increases, the buyer should buy less at each adjustment opportunity. Also,
an increase in PB has a greater impact on the optimal buy-up-to levels toward the end of the
period than at the start of the period. Similarly, although not shown here, as PB increases,
Z∗Si increases or stays unchanged, for all i. However, the impact of PB on Z
∗
Si is quite small,
particularly towards the end of the period. Recall that, as shown in Section 3.2, for the last
adjustment opportunity, the sell-down-to level depends only on the selling price and not on
the buying price. Similarly, the buy-up-to level depends only on the buying price and not on
the selling price. For the other adjustment opportunities, the buying price mainly impacts the
buy-up-to levels and the selling price mainly impacts the sell-down-to levels.
Figure 5 shows the impact of the selling price on the optimal sell-down-to levels throughout
the period. For each given PS, Z
∗
Si decreases as we get later in the period, i.e., as i increases.
Although not shown, our numerical results also indicate that Z∗Bi decreases as i increases. The
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results are similar to those in Figure 4. The figure also indicates that, as PS increases, Z
∗
Si
decreases, for all i. Intuitively, as PS increases, the buyer should sell more at each adjustment
opportunity to take advantage of a larger selling price. An increase in PS has a larger impact
on the optimal sell-down-to levels toward the end of the period than at the start of the period.
Similarly, although not shown, as PS increases, Z
∗
Bi remains essentially unchanged, for all i.
Finally, although not shown here, we also studied the impact of the buying and selling prices
on the optimal order-up-to level, Y ∗. As expected, Y ∗ is increasing in both.
Figures 6 and 7 show the impact of the unit penalty cost relative to the unit holding cost,
p/h, on the optimal inventory policy parameters. Figure 6 shows that as p/h increases, Z∗Bi
increases for all i. Figure 7 shows that as p/h increases, Z∗Si increases for all i. These results
imply that as the unit penalty cost becomes more dominant, the buyer should keep more
inventory by buying more and selling less at each adjustment opportunity.
6.4 Effect of the Timing of a Single Adjustment Opportunity
Finally, we study how the timing of a single adjustment opportunity impacts the percentage
value of the adjustment contract to the buyer. We study a single period model (with period
length T ) and consider three alternative timings (t ∈ (0, T )) for the adjustment opportunity:
(1) early adjustment, i.e., t = (1/4)T , (2) middle adjustment, i.e., t = (1/2)T , and (3) late
adjustment, i.e., t = (3/4)T . We let h1 and h2 represent the unit holding cost for the first and
second subperiods, respectively. For the three adjustment timings, we set h1 and h2 as follows:
(1) h1 = 0.05 and h2 = 0.15, (2) h1 = 0.1 and h2 = 0.1, and (3) h1 = 0.15 and h2 = 0.05.
Figure 8 shows that, as the timing moves from early to late, the percentage value of the
adjustment contract increases from 1.1% to 4.5%. Thus the buyer prefers a later adjustment
opportunity. While this is the typical result, it is not always the case. For 6% of the cases
considered, the buyer preferred to have the adjustment opportunity in the middle of the period.
Figure 9 indicates that, as the adjustment opportunity moves later in the period, the optimal
buy-up-to level, Z∗B, and sell-down-to level, Z
∗
S, decrease, while the optimal order-up-to level,
Y ∗, decreases and then increases. The impact of the timing of the adjustment opportunity on
Z∗B and Z
∗
S is larger than on Y
∗, i.e., Z∗B and Z
∗
S are sensitive to the timing of the adjustment
opportunity, but Y ∗ is not. As the adjustment opportunity moves later in the period, the mean
and the variance of the demand in the second subperiod decrease. Thus, the buyer should keep
less inventory for this subperiod by decreasing the buy-up-to and sell-down-to levels.
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7 Conclusions and Future Directions
In this paper, we studied the problem faced by a buyer who procures inventory using a portfolio
of supply contracts consisting of a wholesale price contract and an adjustment contract. For a
multi-period model, we proved that the optimal inventory policy combines a standard order-
up-to policy for the wholesale contract with a buy-up-to, sell-down-to policy for the adjustment
contract. In order to quantify the benefits of the adjustment contract to the buyer, we demon-
strated that using this portfolio of contracts reduces the buyer’s total expected costs for a range
of buying and selling prices. We also demonstrated that the buyer’s total expected costs are
strictly decreasing in the number of adjustment opportunities. We performed a computational
study to study the impact of the problem parameters on the optimal policy.
This paper provides several key contributions to the literature. First, there has been little
research on supply contracts that allow for two-way (i.e., both upward and downward) adjust-
ments to the inventory level. Such adjustment contracts provide clear advantages to the buyer
relative to less flexible supply contracts such as the buyback or quantity flexibility contracts. In
addition, the adjustment contract provides potential benefits for the supplier, i.e., under such
a contract the supplier may be able to charge a high buying price and offer a low buy-back
price at the adjustment times. Thus, there is a practical role for supply contracts that allow
for such two-way adjustments. Second, the adjustment contract we propose also provides clear
advantages to the buyer relative to spot market procurement, which is often risky (i.e., buying
and selling prices are random) and may be subject to limited liquidity. Third, while our paper
shares some similarities with the literature on procurement with spot market participation, we
differ from the literature in some key ways. In particular, we allow the buying and selling prices
to differ, which most of the current literature does not (Goel and Gutierrez (2006) are one ex-
ception). In addition, we consider a number of critical model extensions that are generally not
considered in the literature on spot market procurement, e.g., lead times that may differ for the
different procurement contracts, fixed order costs, and analysis of the infinite horizon problem.
Finally, there are a number of future directions for this research. One important extension
is to study whether adjustment contracts can be used to achieve supply chain coordination.
While this paper provides a key first step by analyzing the buyer’s optimal decisions under an
adjustment contract and by demonstrating the value of the adjustment contract to the buyer,
a key issue that needs to be addressed is the benefit to the supplier who offers the adjustment
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contract. Clearly, by offering adjustment opportunities, the seller may incur higher production
costs. However, as noted above, the supplier may be able to profit from the adjustment contracts
through appropriate price setting. Moreover, a seller who serves many buyers could potentially
take advantage of risk pooling, i.e., may use returns from one buyer to satisfy orders from
another buyer. Li and Ryan (2007) discuss the benefits of the adjustment contract to the
supplier and consider supply chain coordination through adjustment contracts.
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9 Appendix I: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.1: For notational convenience we prove the result for the single period
case; the same approach can be used for the multiple period case. We first prove the optimality
of the policy for the last subperiod. We show that for any z, GBn(z, ZB) is a convex function of
ZB and is minimized when ZB = Z
∗
Bn. To see this, we have
∂
∂ZB
GBn(z, ZB) = 0, which implies
Z∗Bn = F
−1
n+1
(
p−PBn
hn+1+p
)
> 0, and ∂
2
∂Z2B
GBn(z, ZB) ≥ 0.We can also show that for any z, GSn(z, ZS)
is a convex function of ZS and is minimized when ZS = Z
∗
Sn = F
−1
n+1
(
p−PSn
hn+1+p
)
. Furthermore,
p > PBn ≥ PSn implies that Z∗Sn ≥ Z∗Bn > 0. We then have the following expressions for
Gln(z)
4
= minZl≤z Gln(z, Zl), where l = B,S:
GBn(z) =

GBn(z, Z
∗
Bn) = PBn(Z
∗
Bn − z) + Ln+1(Z∗Bn) if z < Z∗Bn,
GBn(z, z) = Ln+1(z) if z ≥ Z∗Bn,
(8)
GSn(z) =

GSn(z, z) = Ln+1(z) if z ≤ Z∗Sn,
GSn(z, Z
∗
Sn) = −PSn(Z∗Sn − z) + Ln+1(Z∗Sn) if z > Z∗Sn.
(9)
Utilizing the above results, together with the convexity of Gln(z, Zl), l = B, S, we have:
Cn(z) = GBn(z) ∧GSn(z) =

PBn(Z
∗
Bn − z) + Ln+1(Z∗Bn) if z < Z∗Bn,
Ln+1(z) if Z
∗
Bn ≤ z ≤ Z∗Sn,
−PSn(Z∗Sn − z) + Ln+1(Z∗Sn) if z > Z∗Sn.
(10)
The expression for Cn(z) indicates that the buy-up-to Z
∗
Bn or sell-down-to Z
∗
Sn policy is optimal.
We can show that Cn(z) is convex by checking the continuity of the first derivative and the sign
of the second derivative. The continuity of the first derivative at points z = Z∗Bn and z = Z
∗
Sn
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is due to the first order conditions that Z∗Bn and Z
∗
Sn satisfy.
We complete the proof by induction. We assume that the proposition holds true for subpe-
riod i ≤ n and analyze subperiod i − 1. First, the assumption that Ci(·) is a convex function
implies that Gl(i−1)(z, Zl), is convex function of Zl, l = B,S, for any z. Next, we let Z∗l(i−1),
l = B,S, denote the solution to ∂
∂Zl
Gl(i−1)(z, Zl) = 0 and thus it satisfies:
Pl(i−1) + (hi + p)Fi(Z∗l(i−1))− p+
∫ ∞
0
C ′i(Z
∗
l(i−1) − s)fi(s)ds = 0, l = B, S, (11)
where C ′i(ξ−s) 4= ddzCi(z−s)
∣∣∣
z=ξ
, for any ξ ∈ lR. We can easily show that Z∗S(i−1) ≥ Z∗B(i−1) > 0
using the fact that Fi(·) and C ′i(·) are both non-decreasing function and C ′i(·) ∈ [−PSi,−PBi].
Following (8)-(9), we next derive expressions for GB(i−1)(z) and GS(i−1)(z):
GB(i−1)(z) =

PB(i−1)(Z∗B(i−1) − z) + Li(Z∗B(i−1)) +
∫ ∞
0
Ci(Z
∗
B(i−1) − s)fi(s)ds if z ≤ Z∗B(i−1),
Li(z) +
∫ ∞
0
Ci(z − s)fi(s)ds if z ≥ Z∗B(i−1).
(12)
GS(i−1)(z) =

Li(z) +
∫ ∞
0
Ci(z − s)fi(s)ds if z ≤ Z∗S(i−1),
−PS(i−1)(z − Z∗S(i−1)) + Li(Z∗S(i−1)) +
∫ ∞
0
Ci(Z
∗
S(i−1) − s)fi(s)ds if z ≥ Z∗s(i−1).
(13)
Following the arguments for the convexity of GBn(z) and GSn(z), we can easily obtain the
convexity for GB(i−1)(z) and GS(i−1)(z). Finally, using (12)-(13) we rewrite Ci−1(z):
Ci−1(z) =

PB(i−1)(Z∗B(i−1) − z) + Li(Z∗B(i−1)) +
∫ ∞
0
Ci(Z
∗
B(i−1) − s)fi(s)ds if z ≤ Z∗B(i−1),
Li(z) +
∫ ∞
0
Ci(z − s)fi(s)ds if z ∈ [Z∗B(i−1), Z∗S(i−1)],
−PS(i−1)(z − Z∗S(i−1)) + Li(Z∗S(i−1)) +
∫ ∞
0
Ci(Z
∗
S(i−1) − s)fi(s)ds if z ≥ Z∗s(i−1),
which obviously implies the optimality of the buy-up-to or sell-down-to policy. The convex-
ity of Ci−1(z) with respect to z can be proved by using the same arguments we used for Cn(z).
Proof of Proposition 3.2: We will prove (i)-(iii) in order. First, note from Proposition 3.1
that Z∗B only depends on PB and Z
∗
S only depends on PS. Therefore, Z
∗
B and Z
∗
S will change
only if PB and PS change, respectively. Note that Y
∗ satisfies the corresponding first order
condition, i.e., w − p + (h1 + p)F1(Y ∗) + +(h2 + p) ∫ Z∗SZ∗B f2(s)F1(Y ∗ − s)ds = 0. Differentiating
both sides of the equation with respect to PB and PS, we find that Y
∗ does not decrease as PB
increases or as PS increases. Furthermore, as PB increases, it is clear that Z
∗
B = F
−1
2
(
p−PB
h2+p
)
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does not increase. As PS increases, Z
∗
S = F
−1
2
(
p−PS
h2+p
)
does not increase. Thus (ii) and (iii) are
proved. It is easy to see that Y ∗ does not increase as w increases and thus (i) is proved.
Proof of Proposition 3.3: We first prove that the optimality of the buy-up-to or sell-down-
to policy preserves for the infinite horizon case. Suppose the optimal policy is of any format.
It is easy to show that | ∫∞−∞C ′i+1(z − s)f(s)ds| ≤ PB for all i and z ∈ lR. This implies
that limm→∞ αm
∫∞
−∞C
′
m(z − s)f(s)ds = 0 for all z ∈ lR, where Cm(·) represents the minimum
expected cost for the remainder horizon after the (m+1)st inventory decision point, which can be
a regular order or an adjustment order. Using this result, we can show that
∫∞
−∞C
′
i+1(z−s)f(s)ds
is convex and thus the optimality of the buy-up-to and sell-down-to policy.
To prove the proposition, we first note that Z∗B0 and Z
∗
Bi, i = 1, . . . , n, satisfy:

w + L′(Z∗B0) + α
∫∞
−∞C
′
1(Z
∗
B0 − s)f(s)ds = 0
PB + L
′(Z∗Bi) + α
∫∞
−∞C
′
i+1(Z
∗
Bi − s)f(s)ds = 0
(14)
The solution, Z∗B0, . . . , Z
∗
Bn, to equation (14) is unique. It suffices to show that Z
∗
B0 =
Z∗B1 = · · · = Z∗Bn = F−1
(
p−(1−α)w
h+p
)
satisfies (14). If PB = w, we have for i = 0: C
′
0(z) = −w if
z ≤ Z∗B0; L′(z) + α
∫ ∞
−∞
C ′1(z − s)f(s)ds if z ≥ Z∗B0. For i = 1, . . . , n, C ′i(z) = −w if z ≤ Z∗Bi;
L′(z)+α
∫ ∞
−∞
C ′i+1(z−s)f(s)ds if Z∗Bi ≤ z ≤ Z∗Si; −PS if z ≥ Z∗Si, where C ′n+1(z−s) = C ′0(z−s).
Now we can verify that Z∗B0 = Z
∗
B1 = · · · = Z∗Bn = F−1
(
p−(1−α)w
h+p
)
satisfies (14).
Proof of Propositions 4.1 and 4.2: We prove Proposition 4.1; Proposition 4.2 can be shown
similarly. Utilizing the buy-up-to or sell-down-to policy, we see that C(x) = CNA(x) if and only
if the optimal action at each adjustment opportunity is neither buy nor sell. In other words,
C(x) = CNA(x) if and only if P
{
max{x, y∗NA} −
∑i
k=1Dk ∈ [Z∗Bi, Z∗Si], for all i
}
= 1. Since
C(x) ≤ CNA(x), the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 5.3: Using “left” KB-convexity and “right” KS-convexity, we have:
GB(z) =

GB(z, Z
∗
B) = KB + PB(Z
∗
B − z) + L2(Z∗B) if z < z∗B,
GB(z, z) = L2(z) if z ≥ z∗B.
GS(z) =

GS(z, z) = L2(z) if z ≤ z∗S,
GS(z, Z
∗
S) = KS − PS(z − Z∗S) + L2(Z∗S) if z > z∗S,
(15)
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which, together with further comparison, implies the following:
C1(z) =

GB(z, Z
∗
B) = KB + PB(Z
∗
B − z) + L2(Z∗B) if z < z∗B,
GB(z, z) = GS(z, z) = L2(z) if z
∗
B ≤ z ≤ z∗S,
GS(z, Z
∗
S) = KS − PS(z − Z∗S) + L2(Z∗S) if z > z∗S,
(16)
where z∗B ≤ z ≤ z∗S is feasible due to the fact that z∗B < z∗S, which is implied by the facts:
Z∗B < Z
∗
S, z
∗
B < Z
∗
B, and z
∗
S > Z
∗
S. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5.4: (16), together with the definitions of z∗B, Z
∗
B, z
∗
S and Z
∗
S, implies
that C1(z) is continuous and differentiable. However, C
′
1(z), is not continuous when z = z
∗
B
and z = z∗S. But
∫ ∞
−∞
C1(y − s)f1(s)ds is second differentiable everywhere and d2dy2
∫ ∞
−∞
C1(y −
s)f1(s)ds = [PB + L
′
2(z
∗
B)] f1(y−z∗B)− [PS + L′2(z∗S)] f1(y−z∗S)+
∫ y−z∗B
y−z∗S
L′′2(y−s)f1(s)ds, which
is continuous in y but may not be positive. Thus, the second derivative of w(y − x) + L1(y) +∫ ∞
−∞
C1(y−s)f1(s)ds, as in (5), over y is continuous in y for any x. The curve w(y−x)+L1(y)+∫ ∞
−∞
C1(y − s)f1(s)ds as a function of y may have multiple local minimums and maximums.
Next, we will show that “left” KO-convexity of C1(z), a sufficient condition for (s, S) policy,
cannot be guaranteed, i.e., we will show that when z ∈ (Z∗S, z∗S) and z + a ∈ [z∗S,∞), as a
is large enough, we will have KO + C1(z + a) − C1(z) − aC ′1(z) < 0. Using (16), we have
KO +C1(z + a)−C1(z)− aC ′1(z) = KO +KS + PS(Z∗S − z) + L2(Z∗S)− L2(z)− a[PS + L′2(z)],
where z ∈ (Z∗S, z∗S) and z + a ∈ [z∗S,∞). Since L2(·) is a convex function, z ∈ (Z∗S, z∗S) implies
that L′2(z) > −PS, which implies [PS+L′2(z)] > 0. Thus, for any fixed z ∈ (Z∗S, z∗S), we have that
if a > max
{
z∗S − z, KO+KS+PS(Z
∗
S−z)+L2(Z∗S)−L2(z)
PS+L
′
2(z)
}
, then KO+C1(z+ a)−C1(z)− aC ′1(z) < 0.
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